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Abstract—Wireless communication has been a broadcast sys-
tem since its inception, which violates security and privacy
issues at the physical layer between the intended transmit
and receive pairs. As we move towards advanced spectrum
sharing methodologies involving billions of devices connected over
wireless networks, it is essential to secure the wireless signal such
that only the intended receiver can realize the properties of the
signal. In this paper, we propose Rand-OFDM, a new waveform,
secured with a shared secret key, where the signal properties can
be recovered only at the expected receiver. We achieve the signal
level security by modifying the OFDM signal in time-domain,
thus erasing the OFDM properties and in turn obfuscating the
signal properties to an eavesdropper. We introduce a key-based
secured training signal for channel estimation, which can be
used only at the intended receiver with prior knowledge of the
key. As a final step for the recovery of the signal, we use a
clustering based technique to correct the phase of the received
signal. Our cryptanalysis shows that Rand-OFDM is especially
useful in future wide band signals. Extensive simulation and over-
the-air experiments show that the performance of Rand-OFDM
is comparable to legacy OFDM and SNR penalty due to the
secured waveform varies between ≈ 1-4dB. In all these scenarios,
Rand-OFDM remains unrecognized by the adversary even at the
highest possible SNR.
I. INTRODUCTION
As new spectrum (sub-6GHz, mmWave and TeraHertz)
becomes available for communication and coexistence of
frequency-agile cognitive heterogeneous nodes becomes a
norm, we need to rethink physical layer security to provide
maximum secrecy in a broadcast channel. There has been
a growing interest recently among multiple federal agencies
to utilize the spectrum in a collegial way by heterogeneous
devices. This also indicates that wireless signals will be
vulnerable to various security attacks, which was unforeseen
in prior extremely regulated framework. This motivates us to
investigate in physical layer secured communication, which is
hard to decipher by an eavesdropper in a hostile scenario, as
well as practical enough to be accepted for mass deployments.
Prior work [1]–[5] utilizes imperfection of the communica-
tion channel to establish secrecy by physical layer methods
without the need of a shared secret key. However, channel
imperfections are not enough to provide high secrecy capacity
when the eavesdropper has a high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
or has similar quantized channel state as the intended receiver.
Higher layer encryption [6] provides computationally hard
secrecy, but there exists key management and distribution
issues. Also, since the waveform remains unchanged in all the
above mentioned scenarios, it is plausible for the eavesdropper
to restrict cryptanalysis search space within that waveform.
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Fig. 1: Rand-OFDM: A system overview.
To address these issues for future wireless agile radios, we
introduce physical layer security, where we modify the OFDM
waveform to completely disrupt its orthogonality properties of
the subcarriers based on a shared secret key. At the receiver,
we perform extensive channel estimation and reconstruct the
waveform. The secret key can be derived from the channel
or stored in the radio hardware, which will minimize the key
distribution issues. In this paper, we only focus on modification
of the time-domain signal at the transmitter and reconstruction
of that back at the receiver.
If M is the message that Alice needs to transmit to Bob,
she can encrypt it with the shared secret key (K) to produce
X . As it reaches Bob, it passes through the channel HAB ,
such that the received signal is YB = XHAB + NB , where
NB is the noise. An eavesdropper, Eve, will experience a
different channel and will receive YE = XHAE + NE . If
channel imperfections are used to encrypt, secrecy capacity
is a function of received SNR at Eve. In this scenario, we
propose Rand-OFDM, where we modify the time domain
signal, such that the transmitted signal, X , is no longer a
known waveform (OFDM, CDMA, etc.). Figure 1 shows an
overview of Rand-OFDM, where we randomize the time do-
main OFDM signal based on K, such that the resultant X does
not have orthogonality property. Due to the spectral efficiency
of OFDM and its use in most standards, like Wi-Fi [7], 5G [8],
we have chosen it as the candidate for generating the base
waveform.
Our approach has two distinct benefits over prior work.
Firstly, secret key based approach to modify the signal in-
dicates that even at high SNR or even if Eve has full channel
knowledge between Alice and Bob, HAB , she will not be
able to decode X . In other words, if Eve gets access to
Y ′E = XHAB + NB , she will not be able to decode X
without the key K, which is used to generate X . Secondly, by
modifying the time domain signal based on a key, we ensure
that it appears as a noise or an unknown signal to Eve. The
combination of the key and data will create a different signal
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every time it is transmitted. Thus it creates a larger search
space for Eve to attack this waveform. It is to be noted here
that any higher layer encryption or bit level interleaving can
be used in conjunction with Rand-OFDM to provide multiple
layers of protection from different security threats.
The major challenges of Rand-OFDM are: 1) to design a
computationally light operation to modify the OFDM wave-
form in time-domain, 2) to estimate the channel effects
accurately at the receiver, which looses frequency domain
properties due to the time domain modifications, 3) to hide
the channel parameters in a way to make it difficult for the
eavesdropper to estimate the channel accurately, and 4) to
architect a design to correct the residual phase offsets due
to the absence of pilot subcarriers in frequency domain. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to modify the
time domain wireless OFDM signal to loose the orthogonality
of the signal and introduce novel channel estimation technique
to recover the signal back at the receiver and evaluated the
system in practical over-the-air scenarios. Hence, the key
contributions of our work can be listed as follows:
Key-based Time Domain Security: We designed a secret key
based time domain modification of the OFDM signal to
generate a new waveform, Rand-OFDM, which does not retain
any OFDM properties that are essential to combat the multi-
path effects of the channel. At the receiver, we successfully
reconstruct the signal by channel estimation and decryption of
the Rand-OFDM waveform.
Secured Training Signal: We designed a novel training signal
based on a shared phrase or data with the same randomization
key, such that only the intended receiver is able to correctly
decode it to estimate the channel accurately at the receiver.
Clustering based Phase Offset Correction: We scramble the
signal in time domain, where the frequency domain pilots
change in both phase and magnitude and cannot be used as
known symbols for channel estimation or phase tracking. We
introduced a unique solution to track the residual phase offset
by utilizing K-medoids clustering algorithm underneath.
Cryptanalysis: We perform cryptographic analysis on the
Rand-OFDM signal, and provide insights on the resiliency of
the waveform, specially for higher orders of FFT, as envisioned
in next generation of wireless systems.
Practical Evaluation: In midst of mostly theoretical research
in time domain physical layer security, we formulated the
mathematical problem for Rand-OFDM and provided a re-
ceiver design that is essential for successfully decoding the
signal in multipath-rich environment. We also evaluated our
system using extensive experiments over the air in an indoor
environment for the protocol to be embraced for practical
deployment.
II. RELATED WORK
Time domain security: A fairly decent amount of research
has been done in recent years to modify the time domain
signal to achieve security in physical layer. However, most
of them are either theoretical or are dependent on impractical
assumptions. In [9], authors introduced an OFDM encryption
scheme based on multiplying the real and the imaginary parts
of the generated OFDM by dynamic values based on a shared
secret key between the transmitter and the receiver. This
changes the signal values, which changes the Peak-to-Average
Power Ratio (PAPR) of the OFDM symbol. The results are
evaluated only for simulated AWGN channel, where there is
no channel effects. Authors in [10] uses a random shuffling
based on a secret key. The algorithm has been evaluated for
a flat fading channel, where channel effects are negligible.
These works do not attempt to introduce any channel or phase
correction at the receiver due to theoretical nature of these
research.
In [11], authors propose a time domain physical layer
security scheme based on modifying the length of the cyclic
prefix (CP) to be equal to the channel impulse response of
the intended user, whereas the channel impulse of Eve may
be longer than the intended user. This introduces inter symbol
interference (ISI) to the received signal of the Eve. However,
if Eve has a better channel compared to Bob, this technique
fails. In [12], authors propose adding an artificial noise to the
time domain OFDM signal such that when it passes through
the receiver channel, it gets accumulated on the Cyclic Prefix.
The receiver can decode the message after removing the CP,
while the eavesdropper’s signal can not be recovered due to
the presence of the noise. This is also a theoretical attempt
without any receiver modification in practical scenarios.
Frequency domain secrecy: Modifying the frequency domain
signal is a common technique to achieve secured [13]–[16] or
covert communication [17]. In [13], the transmitter uses the
non fading subcarriers to the intended user for data transmis-
sion. The assumption of this theoretical work is that Eve’s
channel has a completely different deep fading, which might
not be a practical assumption. In [14], the authors proposed
an algorithm to provide pre-coder and post-coder matrices
to make the channel matrix of the legitimate user to be
diagonal. Also the authors in [15] proposed an optimal channel
selection for channel indices to maximize the SINR for the
legitimate user to achieve secure communication. In [16], the
author proposed an encryption algorithm for OFDM system
based on dummy data insertion of a portion of sub carrier
to make performance degradation at the eavesdropper. It is
to be noted that frequency domain modification retains the
OFDM properties and reveals the waveform characteristics to
the eavesdropper.
Space domain secrecy: Use of MIMO antennas [18]–[20]
to beamform towards the intended receiver and/or steer null
towards the eavesdropper is another way to enable physical
layer security. The two major assumptions in these set of work
are a) Eve will have fewer antenna elements, which cannot
be accurate in the world of electronic warfare and b) Eve is
not in the path of beam pattern radiation, which is inaccurate
specially when devices are getting smaller and can be placed
anywhere in plain sight.
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Fig. 2: Time domain and frequency domain representation of Rand-OFDM at the transmitter.
III. BACKGROUND
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is a
digital multicarrier modulation technique, where subcarriers
are orthogonal to each other. This is achieved by Inverse Fast
Fourier transform (IFFT) on the modulated data stream. For
N parallel data streams, N − point IFFT is performed on
the complex digital modulated signal X(n). The time domain
signal x(n), can be expressed as:
x[n] = IFFT (X[n]) =
N−1∑
i=1
X(i)e
j2piin
N (1)
In order for the IFFT/FFT to create an intersymbol inter-
ference (ISI) free channel, the channel must appear to provide
a circular convolution. Hence, a cyclic prefix of length v is
appended after the IFFT operation, resulting in N + v samples,
which are then sent in serial through the wireless channel.
The duality between circular convolution in the time do-
main and simple multiplication in the frequency domain is
a property unique to the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT),
which can be utilized to represent the received OFDM signal
Y (n) = H(n)X(n).
At the receiver, the cyclic prefix is discarded, and the N
received symbols are demodulated, using an FFT operation,
which results in N data symbols. The received frequency
domain signal Y (n) is given by:
Y [n] = FFT [y(n)] =
N−1∑
i=1
y(i)e
−j2piin
N (2)
where y is the received OFDM symbol in the time domain.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN OF RAND-OFDM
In this section, we introduce the system design of
Rand-OFDM, which predominantly has modifications at both
the transmitter and the receiver side. The key idea of
Rand-OFDM lies in randomizing the FFT output or the time
domain digital complex signals to loose the OFDM properties,
such that it appears as a wideband noise to the eavesdropper.
Figure 2 shows such an example a) time domain signal after
the IFFT output, followed by b) its randomized version, which
is transmitted over the air. The c) frequency response of
the transmitted Rand-OFDM signal and d) its constellation
plot show that we have successfully destroyed the OFDM
properties for the signal to appear as a noise at the transmitter
side, even before the channel impairments are introduced.
Figure 3 shows the transmitter and receiver modules, which
are discussed in § IV-A and § IV-B respectively.
A. Transmitter Design of Rand-OFDM
Rand-OFDM transmitter is based on Wi-Fi [7] like
OFDM [21] building blocks. We introduce a new block termed
Randomizer after the IFFT block in the OFDM transmitter
chain, as shown in figure 3. The Randomizer introduces time
domain scrambling of the resultant time domain complex
samples from the IFFT block. The time domain scrambling is
based on a shared secret key between the transmitter and the
receiver pair. In other words, this is the symmetric key that is
used both in encryption and decryption process. For example,
if the original OFDM symbol is [a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5], then
the resulted randomized sequence is [a5, a3, a1, a2, a4], where
the key is [5, 3, 1, 2, 4]. The cyclic prefix (CP) is added after
that to be able to extract frequency response of the channel at
the receiver, which is detailed in § IV-B.
As the Randomizer block is added in the OFDM transmit-
ter chain, the time domain Rand-OFDM signal, xt, can be
expressed as:
xt = PCPRF
−1XF (3)
where PCP is the cyclic prefix matrix, R is the randomizer
matrix and F−1 is the inverse Fourier Transform Matrix.
By randomizing in time domain, the secured transmitted
wave form has lost all the OFDM properties. In other words,
the Rand-OFDM transmitted wave form Xt can given by:
Xt = FTxt = FRF
−1XF (4)
where T is the truncation matrix for cyclic prefix removal and
F is the N-FFT matrix and can be given as:
F =

W 0,0 W 0,1 ......... W 0,N−1
W 1,0 W 1,1 ......... W 1,N−1
.
.
WN−1,0 WN−1,1 ......... WN−1,N−1
 (5)
where Wn,k = e−2jpi
nk
N and N is the FFT size.
FRF−1 =
1
N
∑
e2jpi
n(k−m)
N =
{
I, R = I
Q, R 6= I (6)
where I is the identity matrix and Q is the generated trans-
formation matrix due to the presence of R.
From equation 6, we can conclude that if there is no
randomization in the time domain samples (i.e RF = I), the
OFDM symbol retains its orthogonality property. Otherwise,
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a magnitude and phase noise is added to the received OFDM
symbol. This distorts the original OFDM symbol by trans-
forming the original constellation into a random constellation
pattern which depends on the randomization matrix R. We
would like to highlight here that the changes introduced in
this stage do not depend on the original modulation order
of the transmitted constellation. Moreover, the transformation
matrix spreads the power of the OFDM symbol over the
whole bandwidth including the guard bands. Figure 2 shows
the transformation of an OFDM symbol to a Rand-OFDM
symbol. In this case, 52 subcarriers were modulated with
BPSK modulated signal, generating the time domain OFDM
signal as in figure 2a. The resultant signal goes through a
Randomizer to generate the Rand-OFDM waveform as shown
in figure 2b. If we perform FFT on this waveform, we notice
that the magnitude of the subcarriers are varying randomly, as
well as the power spreads to all 64 subcarriers and not confined
to only 52, as we started with. This is evident in figure 2c,
which is due to the matrix multiplication of R. Figure 2d
shows the phase noise that is induced due to the randomization.
These imperfections require significant modifications in the
receiver design, which is explained in § IV-B.
The packet structure of Rand-OFDM is shown in figure 4,
where the short and long preambles of legacy 802.11 [7]
system are used to detect the start of the packet. Rest of
the MAC layer packet structure remains same except they
are modified just before transmission to the Rand-OFDM
waveform. A training signal of one OFDM symbol duration
is appended to improve the channel estimation at the intended
receiver, the design of which is detailed in § V-A.
B. Receiver Design of Rand-OFDM
The receiver design of Rand-OFDM is based on legacy
802.11a/g [7] receiver blocks, where yellow colored blocks are
the ones which we added or modified, as shown in figure 3.
Receiver design starts with a packet detection block, followed
by Carrier Frequency Offset (CFO) correction and removal
of cyclic prefix. FFT follows right after that to convert the
data to the frequency domain. Based on the modifications
at the transmitter, it might seem that we need to insert
the Derandomizer block just before the data goes into the
FFT block. One of the major components before the FFT
is the channel correction, as the received waveform can be
represented as:
Yt = HtXt +Nt = HtPCPRF
−1XF +Nt (7)
where Ht is the channel impulse response in time domain
and Nt is the noise. At this point, we need to estimate
and correct the channel impairments at the receiver. Time
domain channel estimation and correction has been shown to
be computationally more expensive [22], due to which we
choose to perform it in frequency domain. Derandomizing
the signal before extracting the channel information would
make the channel estimation problem intractable. Hence, we
convert the signal to frequency domain to extract the frequency
domain channel response, which is first corrected on the signal.
Once the cyclic prefix is removed, we perform N-point FFT to
convert the time domain signal Yt to frequency domain. The
received waveform in frequency domain can then be expressed
as:
XrF = FTYt = HFFRF
−1XF +NF (8)
where HF is the channel frequency response. Channel estima-
tion for Rand-OFDM is discussed in details in § V-A. In the
following discussion, we assume that we know the channel HF
and inverse it yielding received frequency domain waveform
X˜rF without channel impairments.
X˜rF = H
−1
F XrF = FRF
−1XF + N˜F (9)
This is the output of the channel correction block as shown
in figure 3, which is in frequency domain. We introduced the
randomization in time domain, and hence it is necessary to
convert it back to time domain as a part of the decryption
block. After the signal is passed through the IFFT block of
the decryption process, it can be represented as
F−1X˜rF = F−1FRF−1XF + N˜F = RF−1XF + N˜F (10)
Now, this time domain signal is passed through the Derandom-
ization block to yield the correct time domain data symbols.
R−1RF−1XF + N˜F = F−1XF + N˜F (11)
The final step is to perform FFT on equation 11 to demodulate
the data subcarriers.
FF−1XF + N˜F = XF + N˜F (12)
We introduce another Phase Offset Correction phase, which is
detailed in § V-B.
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V. DISTORTIONS FROM CHANNEL AND HARDWARE
Imperfections at the received are induced due to the wireless
multipath channel and the underlying hardware. In this section,
we illustrate the methodologies that we introduce to estimate
and counteract the imperfections to yield better performance.
A. Training signal based channel estimation
Accurate estimation of channel is essential in high fre-
quency selective fading channels, specially at higher order
modulations, where minimal error in channel estimation will
lead to significant error in demodulation. In § IV-B, we
assumed complete knowledge of the channel HF , which is
an incorrect assumption in practical systems. Partial channel
estimation on only 52 subcarriers of long preamble and extrap-
olating that for 64 subcarriers, as required for Rand-OFDM,
yields poor performance in multipath channels. Hence, we
design a training signal that spans all 64 subcarriers to better
estimate the channel at the intended receiver. We use a
shared secret data and randomize it based on the same shared
key between Alice and Bob to create one BPSK modulated
Rand-OFDM signal, as described in § IV-A. This OFDM
symbol is transmitted after the preamble as shown in figure 4.
Channel estimation at the receiver requires knowledge of
transmitted waveform, which in this case is secured by the
shared key. Hence, we add another layer of security, where
Eve will not be able to estimate the channel accurately as
the training signal is dependent on the shared secret key, and
physical layer authentication can be initiated using the training
signal [23], [24].
If XTr is the BPSK-modulated OFDM signal, then the
Rand-OFDM training signal can be derived from equation 3
as xTr = PCPRF−1XTr. The received training signal can be
derived from equation 7 as
yTr = HtPCPRF
−1XTr +NTr (13)
Since XTr and R matrices are shared between the transmitter
and the intended receiver only, the channel can be estimated
by only Bob. Ignoring the noise, channel frequency response
can be estimated by:
HF =
FTyTr
XTr
(14)
Figure 5 shows the actual and the estimated phase and magni-
tude of the channel in frequency selective fading conditions. It
is obvious that training signal channel estimation gives an ac-
curate channel estimation for the whole 64 sub-carriers rather
than the preamble channel estimation which only concerns on
52 sub-carriers .
B. Clustering based phase offset correction
Device impairments introduce difference between the carrier
frequency of the receiver and that of the transmitter. Coarse
and fine carrier frequency offset correction blocks are intro-
duced at the receiver to estimate and correct those offsets
based on short and long preambles respectively, as shown
in figure 3. Residual carrier frequency offset of conventional
OFDM received waveform is calculated based on the pilot
subcarriers. In Rand-OFDM, the pilots inserted in frequency
domain do not capture the channel frequency response at those
subcarriers as the pilot energy gets spread due to the process
of randomization. Hence, we introduce a clustering based
algorithm to track the residual phase offset due to hardware
impairments. It is to be noted here that the purpose of this
block is not to estimate the variation in channel per OFDM
symbol, which can be accurately estimated by inserting pilot
subcarriers in every OFDM symbol. This block is intended
to estimate and correct the offset between the transmitter and
receiver pairs, which do not change from one OFDM symbol
to the next.
We use K-mediods clustering algorithm [25], where the
input to the algorithm is the In-Phase and Quadrature values
of the constellation points of all the subcarriers of all received
OFDM symbols in a packet and the number of expected
clusters based on the modulation order. The resultant C cluster
centers are then examined to estimate the residual phase offset.
We choose the farthest cluster points in each quadrant to
determine the phase offset. There are also the highest energy
point indicating a total of 4 cluster centers for QAM or QPSK
modulations and only 2 for BPSK. The rationale for choosing
the highest energy point within a quadrant is that there exists
only one such point in the transmitted constellation to which
it can be mapped to. This is a generic approach and can be
scaled to even higher order modulations, like 256-QAM and
beyond. The phase offset is then calculated per quadrant as:
θestimated,i = arg(XTi/Cmax,i) (15)
where XTi is the farthest transmitted constellation point within
a quadrant and Cmax,i is the maximum energy cluster center
of the same quadrant i. Averaging 2 values in BPSK or 4 for
other modulation orders, we calculate residual phase offset as:
θestimated =
1
M
∑M
i=1 θestimated,i (16)
where M is 2 for BPSK and 4 for other modulations. In the
last step, we correct the residual phase offset by multiplying
the estimated phase to the received signal to generated the cor-
rected signal, XFc, which can then be used for demodulation.
XFc = XF e
jθestimated (17)
where XF is the received OFDM signal before correction. Fig-
ure 6 shows an example scenario of over-the-air experiments at
15dB SNR, where the residual phase offset is corrected based
on the proposed clustering algorithm.
VI. CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section, we perform security analysis on
Rand-OFDM to evaluate its resiliency against various
types of attacks. For simplicity, let’s assume that the received
OFDM symbol at Eve is:
YE = FRF
−1XF (18)
According to Shannon secrecy [26], the system can be per-
fectly secure if the key size equals to the data size such that:
E(Ri) ≥ E(XF ) (19)
where E(X) is the entropy of the random variable X .
This analysis can easily be realized in bit level, however in
physical layer we observe it from two different viewpoints.
First, the system achieves perfect secrecy on symbol level
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Fig. 6: Clustering based residual phase offset correction for
over the air indoor experiments using 16QAM modulation.
as both the data symbol size and the key size are equal to
the FFT size N. In other words, Eve can not deduce any
information with one symbol. Second, if the system has a
set of keys K = [K1,K2,K3, ...,KV ], and OFDM frame
X = [X1, X2, X3, ..., Xn], the mutual information between the
encrypted and original symbols equal to:
lim
V→n
I(XE , XF ) = 0 (20)
A. Brute-force attack
In this attack, the eavesdropper knows the encryption and
the decryption algorithm, however the key is unknown. The
eavesdropper performs an exhaustive search on all possible
keys to decrypt the cipher data (i.e the encrypted data). The
strength of the algorithm is proportional to the length of the
key, which is the size of FFT for Rand-OFDM. The number
of all possible keys L is given by L = N !, where N is the
FFT size. So the probability of success Ps to predict the key
is uniformly distributed and is given by Ps = 1L . FFT size has
been chosen to be 64, which is minimum for 802.11a/g [7],
and can be a much larger value of 1024 or 2048 in newer
wideband Wi-Fi and 5G standards.
B. Cipher text attack
In this attack, YE is only available with the decryption
function D. Eve tries to predict RE by attempting different
keys based on the statistical properties on the cipher data.
However, since the security layer is introduced in physical
layer, especially in time domain, the statistical properties of
the received waveform does not change, for example received
power or the peak to average power ration (PAPR). So Eve
has to try all possible keys to decrypt the data, resulting in
Brute-force attack.
Channel AWGN Flat Frequency Selective
Model - Rayleigh Rayleigh
No. of taps 0 1 6
Path delays 0 0 [0,100,200,300,500,700] ns
Path loss 0 0 [0,-3.6,-7.2,-10.8,-18,-25.2] dB
Doppler 0 0 3Hz
TABLE I: Channel Models
C. Chosen plain text attack
In this attack, YE and XF are known at the eavesdropper. In
other words, Eve knows some pattern and the corresponding
cipher patterns. For fixed key, Eve can solve equation 18 and
deduce the corresponding RE . However the security of the
algorithm can be increased by using a defined shared set
of keys K = [K1,K2, ...,KV ], and the selected shared key
changed dynamically from one symbol to another based on
certain distribution fK(K). In this case, Eve has to deduce
the statistical properties of the key distribution for multiple
attacks assuming K is known.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance analysis of the
Rand-OFDM system in comparison with legacy 802.11a/g in
different channel models. Although we do not use any pilot
symbols, they are still inserted as in the legacy system such
that same number of data bits are transmitted for both the
cases. We used MATLAB to encrypt and decrypt the signals
and used the channel models to perform extensive simulations
for both legacy OFDM and Rand-OFDM. For the rest of the
paper, the suffixes (L) and (R) are used for legacy OFDM [7]
and Rand-OFDM transmissions with full channel knowledge
respectively. In addition, we use (R-T) using training signal
based channel estimation.
A. Without Channel Estimation
We evaluate the performance of Rand-OFDM receiver
blocks as described in § IV-B in the basic scenario, where
no channel estimation is required.
1) AWGN Channel: The first case for evaluation is Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel, where the channel
frequency response matrix HF = I , since both time and
frequency coefficients are unity. Figure 7a shows the BER
performance of Rand-OFDM in AWGN channel for different
modulation orders. Performance of Rand-OFDM is close to
that of legacy OFDM signal. This is due to the fact that OFDM
structure, even when lost, can be reconstructed back at the
receiver in the absence of channel effects. From equation 10,
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Fig. 7: BER of Rand-OFDM compared to legacy OFDM. Figures (a,b) with complete channel knowledge and (c,d) with
training signal channel estimation.
it is evident that if the eavesdropper does not have the key to
generate the matrix R, she can not decode the packet. This
is shown in the results as well, where the BER curve for Eve
remains constant and never go down even at higher SNRs.
This is a major advantage of using key-based physical layer
security over channel based encryption techniques. We choose
not to show the BER curve for Eve as she was unable to decode
in the best possible channel.
2) Complete channel knowledge: In this section, the per-
formance of the proposed system is evaluated assuming that
we have full channel knowledge (i.e HF is known). Based
on ITU-R recommendation, we assume frequency selective
indoor channel model with parameters shown in table I. We
assume that legacy receiver also knows the HF matrix. Fig-
ure 7b shows the performance of Rand-OFDM in a frequency
selective channel when the channel is known at the receiver.
If channel is known, the SNR gap between legacy OFDM
and Rand-OFDM is due to the modification of the waveform,
which cannot be retrieved at the receiver.
B. With Channel Estimation
In this section, we analyze the performance of the channel
estimation techniques, as elaborated in § V-A in two differ-
ent channel models, ‘Flat Fading’ and ‘Frequency Selective
Fading’, as shown in table I.
Training signal is used to estimate the wireless channel
effect for Rand-OFDM transmissions, while legacy OFDM
signal did not require this extra OFDM symbol. Figure 7c
shows the performance of the training signal based channel
estimation, which performs well due to the accuracy of the
channel estimation using the training signal channel estima-
tion. there is a small SNR penalty around ≈ 2dB due to the
loss of orthogonality due to the randomization process at the
transmitter. This is expected as the channel effects are minor
in a relative flat channel. Figure 7d shows the performance in
a multipath rich environment, where the channel is extremely
frequency selective. Results indicate that the newly introduced
training signal is not only secured, but also provides accurate
channel estimation for the signal to be reconstructed back with
minimal SNR penalty. The SNR gap between legacy OFDM
and Rand-OFDM is ≈ 4dB, indicating that it can be embraced
in various practical scenarios.
VIII. OVER THE AIR EXPERIMENTS
We perform extensive over-the-air experiments in indoor
scenario to validate Rand-OFDM. Figure 9 shows one of our
transceiver nodes equipped with USRP X310 [27] with 10
dBi antenna. It is connected to an Intel NUC (NUC7i7BNH)
with i7-7567U processor and 16GB DDR4 memory for faster
processing of the I/O. The experiments are performed in
multiple locations in a multipath-rich indoor environment in
both line of sight and non-line-of-sight scenarios. We present
the results for an average of all those locations to eliminate
any dependencies on channel. Also, all the experiments were
performed at 20MHz bandwidth and 2.484GHz frequency to
avoid any interference from the Wi-Fi Access Points operating
in the same area. Each data point in our result is an average of
500 OFDM symbols for both legacy OFDM and Rand-OFDM.
Fig. 9: Experimental
setup of one node.
Figure 8 shows the BER
performance for legacy and
Rand-OFDM transmissions for
different modulation orders. It is
evident that there is an SNR gap
between the Rand-OFDM and
the Legacy OFDM transmission.
This gap is due to the loss of
orthogonal property of OFDM
signal and channel estimation
imperfections. This is the
SNR penalty that we incur
to secure a waveform in time
domain. Moreover, the SNR gap
decreases at higher modulation
order due to the higher operated SNR, which enables the
receiver to decrease the error space in channel estimation
using the training signal. In other words, the error introduced
due to time-domain modification can be reconstructed back
more efficiently at a higher SNR.
Figure 10 presents the phase angle correction distribution
for different modulation orders over all packets at different
SNRs. The residual phase error is dependent on the hardware
impairments and not on modulation order or channel charac-
teristics. This is evident from the values, which varies between
0.05 to 0.12 radians. The phase correction results indicate
that there exists significant residual error, which needs to be
corrected to improve the performance.
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Fig. 8: BER of Rand-OFDM compared with legacy OFDM for over-the-air experiments using different modulation orders.
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Fig. 10: Residual phase offset correction for different modu-
lation orders.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present Rand-OFDM, a secure OFDM
transmission based on time domain scrambling using a shared
secret key between the transmitter and the receiver. We
perform channel estimation and equalization to retrieve the
signal. Furthermore, we introduce a secured training signal
to accurately estimate the channel followed by cluster based
residual phase error correction. Over the air experiments
show the success probability of this system. In future, the
key generation and management can be developed based on
channel state for lightweight secured physical layer encryption.
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